by Larry Nowels
Today, we have a new opportunity to comprehensively reform and modernize foreign assistance, an opportunity driven by a collection of factors:
- the profoundly altered landscape of global threats in the post-9/11 world;
- a re-definition of U.S. national security that now includes development and diplomacy alongside defense;
- the emergence of multiple new foreign aid actors, led by private foundations and other non-governmental organizations;
- the attention of the Bush administration to expanded and innovative mechanisms in the delivery of aid that nevertheless have made policies less consistent;
- and emerging recognition that global development and poverty reduction are critical in achieving sustainable security and meeting this country’s moral responsibilities.
We are approaching a window in time where a new president and a new Congress have the best chance to push through major reform of a policy area that has been long neglected. For nearly two years, the HELP Commission established by Congress heard from scores of foreign policy and development experts who presented varying and sometimes conflicting ideas of how to reform foreign assistance. Nevertheless, one common theme was articulated by all: the status quo is unacceptable.
The path of reform faces considerable challenges, with opposition coming from a number of quarters. To some extent, opposition will grow or fade based on how the proposed changes take shape: whether new policy strategies are built through the lens of national security or of global development and poverty reduction; whether additional resources are viewed as squeezing out competing demands for domestic priorities; whether the instruments of promoting global development are collected in a cabinet department with a strong, independent voice or are absorbed into the State Department.
Resource Challenges
Making the case for more foreign aid funding is always difficult, even under the most optimal circumstances. Yet foreign assistance budgets have grown in this decade, fueled by initiatives to counter terrorism, combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases, relieve suffering from natural disasters and conflict, and invest in well-performing development partners. Still, strong consensus remains that American civilian foreign policy tools, including foreign assistance, are inadequately funded.
The scale and dimension of the financial crisis, however, offers a more sobering context within which to argue for more taxpayer dollars spent abroad. Some proposals that seemed achievable only months earlier may need to scale back. It will be critical for those advocating for more investments in global economic growth and poverty reduction to link resource allocations to outcome measurements, close evaluation, and the means to demonstrate results in achieving U.S. priorities and those of our global partners.
Institutional Challenges
Few will defend the status quo of how the United States structures the organization and delivery of its assistance, activities that are spread across more than two dozen agencies with no single entity responsible for broad strategy design or accountability. Three general options have emerged for re-structuring the fragmented network of U.S. foreign assistance organizations: 1) establish a cabinet Development Department, on par with the Departments of State and Defense; 2) consolidate and strengthen existing aid agencies into a strong, independent, but sub-cabinet entity that has a voice at the highest levels of government on all global development matters and greater control over its own resources; and 3) align development more closely under the direction of the Secretary of State, including the creation of a Deputy Secretary for Development.
The more “traditional” foreign policy community will object strongly to a cabinet Development Department as removing a core tool from the arsenal of a coherent and integrated civilian-led foreign policy apparatus. Those favoring the elevation of development as a core element of U.S. national security will argue that direct authority of the State Department will sacrifice long-term economic growth and poverty-reduction strategies to the demands of short-term political and strategic interests. The middle ground may be the least difficult to put in place, but is also sure to face challenges depending on the agency’s governing structure, which programs are integrated, and the lines of authority running between it, the State Department, and the president.
Leadership Challenges
Even a modest initiative to repair U.S. foreign assistance will require some degree of leadership from lawmakers and executive officials. The more comprehensive the reform package, the greater will be the need for personal involvement of individuals at the highest levels of government. Chairman Howard Berman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has indicated that re-writing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 will be a top priority in 2009. That is a good start, but others need to step forward, including key senators, leadership in both houses, and Republican members of Congress. Lawmakers can achieve a lot, but core direction should come from the executive branch.
Writing a global development strategy, drafting a new Foreign Assistance Act, and streamlining aid agency structures will require close involvement of top officials in foreign policy departments and the White House. The most difficult hurdles will require presidential intervention. Making this a priority will be daunting as modernization of foreign assistance vies with more front-burner policy matters like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the financial crisis, and other U.S. domestic problems. But without a coherent, collective effort across the entire government, only changes at the margins can be assured.
Challenges from Vested Interests
One reason for the fragmentation and inefficiencies in American foreign assistance is the proportion of funds set aside for selected program sectors, countries, and institutions that over the years have successfully raised them to a priority and protected status within foreign assistance policy and funding allocations. These earmarks, Presidential Initiatives, and special authorities individually merit attention and serious consideration, but collectively they undermine flexibility, add costs, and erode aid effectiveness.American farmers and shippers will object to calls for less tied aid. Advocacy groups will argue that their program focus, whether it’s education, health, agriculture, democracy, water, or climate change, warrants special attention in new legislation and a global development strategy. Working in unison, these advocates of various interests can achieve a great deal in overcoming some of the most fundamental barriers to more effective and efficient U.S. assistance, as well as benefiting their own priorities. Working as competitors, however, will unravel the process and lead to even greater fragmentation. These are only some of the challenges confronting proponents of comprehensive reform in U.S. development and humanitarian assistance. Labor unions representing USAID and other foreign assistance personnel will be skeptical of plans for modernizing and building capacity in the workforce and what it will mean for current employees. Some Americans will question whether jobs will be lost to overseas workers who benefit from economic support provided by the United States.
But what must be kept in mind is that the current state of U.S. foreign assistance is missing opportunities to promote global economic growth, reduce poverty, and bolster America’s moral stature—elements that are fundamental to sustained national security.
Larry Nowels is a member of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (www. modernizingforeignassistance.net), a reform coalition composed of international development and foreign policy practitioners, policy advocates and experts, concerned citizens and private sector organizations. Nowels formerly worked at the Congressional Research Service.
